









                                               1	Lewis	proposes	that	the	fundamental	properties	are	perfectly	natural	and	intrinsic	(Lewis	1983).	This	definition	of	Humean	Supervenience	might	be	in	tension	with	fundamental	physics,	especially	quantum	physics	(see	Maudlin	2007).	See	Lewis	(1986a:	xi,	1994:	474)	for	important	qualifications.	Nothing	in	what	follows	hinges	on	these	qualifications.	
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that	they	are	freely	recombinable:	no	property	instantiation	has	any	modal	implications	for	its	spatiotemporal	neighborhood.2		Humean	reductionism	about	laws	of	nature	is	the	view	that	the	laws	reduce	to	facts	about	the	Humean	mosaic.3	David	Lewis’s	influential	best	systems	account	(BSA),	which	is	based	on	pioneering	work	by	Mill	and	Ramsey,	provides	a	two-step	recipe	for	this	reduction.	First,	look	for	the	best	systematization	of	the	Humean	mosaic.	Such	a	systematization,	according	to	Lewis,	is	an	axiomatized,	deductively	closed	system	that	contains	only	truths.	Furthermore,	the	primitive	vocabulary	in	its	axioms	must	refer	to	perfectly	natural	properties	(Lewis	1983:	367–368).	A	system	is	best,	just	in	case	it	strikes	an	optimal	balance	between	strength	and	simplicity.	Strength	measures	the	information	content	of	the	system	and	simplicity	the	(syntactic)	complexity	of	its	axioms.4	Second,	the	laws	are	identified	with	the	contingent	regularities	that	are	axioms	or	theorems	in	the	best	system	(Lewis	1994:	478).	Lewis	(1983:	367)	initially	suggests	that	if	different	systems	are	tied	for	best,	a	contingent	regularity	must	be	part	of	all	best	systems	in	order	to	be	a	law.	In	later	works	(1994:	479),	he	argues	that	in	such	circumstances	there	would	not	be	any	laws,	though	he	maintains	that	such	ties	are	unlikely.		The	guiding	idea	behind	the	BSA	is	that	the	physical	laws	are	not	identified	in	isolation	as	in	the	case	of	traditional	regularity-theories	(see	Hempel	1965).	Instead	the	laws	are	those	regularities	that	can	be	integrated	into	a	system	that	as	a	whole	describes	as	much	of	the	world	as	possible	in	as	compact	a	way	as	possible	(see	Lewis	1983:	367).	The	BSA	promises	to	distinguish	laws	from	non-laws	without	positing	any	metaphysical	structure	over	and	above	the	Humean	mosaic.	Moreover,	it	arguably	draws	this	distinction	by	appealing	to	the	same	theoretical	virtues	that	physics	itself	uses	when	discovering	laws	(see	Lewis	1983:	367	and	1986a:	123;	cf.	Earman	1986:	88	and	Loewer	2007:	320).	Much	recent	discussion	of	the	BSA	has	focused	on	how	the	





                                               5	Cohen	and	Callender	(2009)	and	Hicks	(forthcoming)	defend	Humean	accounts	of	laws	that	are	(partly)	similar	in	spirit	to	the	one	we	will	propose.	We	contrast	our	account	with	their	respective	accounts	in	section	5.	6	For	instance,	Armstrong	(1983)	identifies	laws	with	instantiations	of	an	irreducible	higher-order	necessitation	relation	between	first	order	universals.	Maudlin	(2007)	regards	the	fundamental	(dynamical)	laws	as	sui	generis	entities.	Bird	(2007)	argues	that	the	laws	originate	
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They	can	then	appeal	to	this	extra	structure	to	explain	why	the	laws	are	of	special	interest	to	science.	Humeans,	by	contrast,	hold	that	the	world	fundamentally	just	is	an	arrangement	of	non-modal	properties.	So,	there	is	no	distinctive	metaphysical	structure	that	demarcates	laws	from	non-laws.	Why	then	are	some	facts	about	the	arrangement	of	non-modal	properties	(viz.,	facts	that	have	the	status	of	laws)	of	special	interest	to	science	but	not	others	(viz.,	facts	that	do	not	have	the	status	of	laws)?	Hall	(2012,	2015)	has	forcefully	argued	that	existing	Humean	theories	of	laws	cannot	fully	explain	the	laws’	importance	for	science.	If	all	that	exists	is	the	Humean	mosaic,	it	would	be	natural	for	science	to	aim	for	laws	that	encode	as	much	information	as	possible	about	the	mosaic	in	as	simple	a	form	as	possible.	This	idea	is	echoed	in	Lewis’s	BSA.	Lewis	(1983:	367)	says	the	following	about	the	virtues	of	best	systems: 	 I	take	a	suitable	system	to	be	one	that	has	the	virtues	we	aspire	to	in	our	own	 theory-building,	and	that	has	them	to	the	greatest	extent	possible	given	the	way		the	world	is.	It	must	be	entirely	true;	it	must	be	closed	under	strict	implication;	it		must	be	as	simple	in	axiomatisation	as	it	can	be	without	sacrificing	too	much		information	content;	and	it	must	have	as	much	information	content	as	it	can	have		without	sacrificing	too	much	simplicity.			So	the	members	of	Lewis’s	best	system	jointly	make	up	the	most	efficient	summary	of	the	Humean	mosaic.	From	the	perspective	of	a	Humean	metaphysics,	it	would	then	appear	to	make	perfect	sense	to	treat	all	of	these	facts	as	laws.	But,	in	fact,	science	does	not	regard	some	of	these	facts	as	even	serious	candidates	for	laws.	(Note	that	Lewis’s	BSA	arguably	already	takes	this	fact	into	account	by	reserving	law	status	for	just	the	regularities	in	the	best	system.	We	will	come	back	to	this	point	shortly.)	Hall	(2015:	270)	points	out	that	if	science	aimed	at	discovering	the	most	informative	and	simplest	systematization	of	the	Humean	mosaic,	then	what	he	calls	the	“phony	fundamental	constant”	would	be	a	serious	candidate	for	a	law.	The	phony	constant	is	a	single	real	number	that	encodes	the	entire	physical	state	of	the	universe	at	an	instant:	“just	take	all	the	coordinates,	masses,	and	charges	of	all	the	particles,	expressed	in	decimal	notation,	and	interleave	the	digits”	(ibid.).	A	system	that	combines	the	phony	constant	with	two-way	deterministic	dynamical	laws	encodes	every	truth	
















                                               8	There	is	one	outstanding	worry	for	this	proposal.	The	epistemic	standards	that	science	uses	to	discover	laws	may	be	tied.	That	is,	two	or	more	systems	may	satisfy	these	criteria	equally	well.	If	Humeans	then	take	these	epistemic	standards	as	constitutive	of	laws,	it	would,	in	this	hypothetical	case,	be	metaphysically	indeterminate	what	the	laws	of	nature	are.	But	this	consequence	is	implausible.	This	worry	seems	to	be	at	the	heart	of	the	two	hypothetical	scenarios	that	Hall	(2015:	ch.	17.7)	discusses	as	further	challenges	for	Humean	reductionism	in	the	conclusion	of	his	article.	Discussing	this	challenge	is	a	topic	for	another	paper.	
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beings	need	to	be	organized	more	efficiently	even	if	that	comes	at	the	cost	of	losing	information.		 Philosophers	frequently	use	the	idea	that	information	about	the	Humean	mosaic	needs	to	be	organized	around	the	cognitive	needs	of	limited	beings	like	us	to	motivate	the	BSA.	David	Albert	imagines	an	audience	with	God	where	you	get	to	ask	about	the	world.	Albert	points	out	that	God	listing	every	single	truth	about	the	world	would	be	of	very	little	use	to	limited	creatures	like	us:		 		[Y]ou	explain	to	God	that	you’re	actually	a	bit	pressed	for	time,	that	this	is	not	all	you	have	to	do	today,	that	you	are	not	going	to	be	in	a	position	to	hear	out	the	whole	story.	And	you	ask	if	maybe	there’s	something	meaty	and	pithy	and	helpful	and	informative	and	short	that	He	might	be	able	to	tell	you	about	the	world	which	(you	understand)	would	not	amount	to	everything,	or	nearly	everything,	but	would	nonetheless	still	somehow	amount	to	a	lot.	Something	that	will	serve	you	well,	or	reasonably	well,	or	as	well	as	possible,	in	making	your	way	about	in	the	world.	(Albert	2015:	23)		Albert	emphasizes	that	beings	like	us	have	limited	resources:	you	are	“a	bit	pressed	for	time”	and	not	in	“a	position	to	hear	out	the	whole	story.”	You	are	better	off	with	something	that	is	cognitively	more	tractable,	even	if	that	means	losing	some	information	content,	as	long	as	the	result	is	still	informative	enough	for	“making	your	way	about	in	the	world.”	Beebee	(2000:	547)	similarly	points	out	that	the	information	in	best	systems	needs	to	be	“comprehensible	to	our	feeble,	finite	minds.”	Despite	its	prominence	in	informally	glossing	the	BSA,	the	idea	of	fitting	the	laws	to	the	cognitive	needs	of	limited	beings	has	played	very	little	role	in	systematically	developing	the	view.9		 For	Humeans,	the	laws	do	not	latch	on	to	any	pre-existing	modal	structure	that	delineates	facts	that	hold	as	a	matter	of	law	from	merely	accidental	facts.	It	is	then	extremely	natural	to	think	that	what	distinguishes	the	laws	has,	at	least	in	part,	to	do	with	us.	As	Hall	(2015:	268)	puts	it,	“[h]ow	could	the	details	of	our	peculiar	human	situation	not	be	relevant	to	this	matter?”	In	what	follows,	we	will	take	up	this	suggestion	and	defend	a	version	of	the	BSA	that	explains	the	laws’	distinctive	status	for	science	in	terms	of	their	usefulness	for	limited	creatures	likes	us.	We	will	argue	that	this	version	of	the	BSA	meets	the	challenge	for	Humean	accounts	we	have	outlined	in	the	previous	
                                               9	Hicks’s	(forthcoming)	“Epistemic	Role	Account”	and	Cohen	and	Callender’s	(2009,	2010)	better	best	system	account	are	an	exception.	We	compare	them	to	our	account	in	section	4.	Dorst	(forthcoming)	develops	a	similar	view	to	the	one	discussed	in	this	paper.		
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section.	Moreover,	it	explains	why	our	actual	candidates	for	the	physical	laws	have	several	striking	features	that	make	them	useful	for	creatures	like	us.		Our	version	of	the	BSA	makes	it	an	explicit	requirement	on	laws	of	nature	that	they	are	useful	for	creatures	like	us.	In	particular,	we	defend	the	following	constraint	on	laws:		 (CU)	 Laws	of	nature	encode	information	in	a	way	that	maximizes	their	cognitive	usefulness	for	creatures	like	us.10			By	‘creatures	like	us’,	we	mean	creatures	with	limited	cognitive	resources	(cf.	Caton	2014	and	Morton	2012).	We	do	not	mean	specifically	humans	or	humans	given	our	current	state	of	technology.	We	mean	creatures	that	have	limitations	with	regard	to	their	cognitive	resources	that	are	general	enough	to	be	shared	by	all	embodied	agents,	including	current	humans,	future	humans,	and	alien	scientists	(if	there	are	any).			 These	limitations	include	the	following:	First,	finite	beings	only	have	incomplete	information.	They	never	know	the	state	of	the	world	with	full	precision.	Instead,	their	knowledge	will	be	partial	and	possibly	slightly	inaccurate	due	to	the	limitations	of	their	perceptual	faculties	and	measurement	equipment.	Second,	they	are	limited	with	regard	to	how	much	information	they	can	store	and	process.	In	particular,	limited	creatures	cannot	compute	arbitrarily	complex	functions.	And,	third,	limited	beings	have	finite	resources.	So,	they	have	an	interest	in	completing	cognitive	tasks	as	efficiently	as	possible,	that	is,	by	minimizing	how	much	information	they	need	to	gather,	store,	or	process.	Our	proposal	is	that	scientific	inquiry	is	structured	around	the	needs	of	creatures	with	these	kinds	of	limitations.			 The	other	notion	that	needs	clarification	is	‘cognitive	usefulness’.	We	assume	that	the	main	cognitive	function	of	the	laws	is	facilitating	predictions.	Laws	of	nature	allow	us	to	derive	new	truths	from	known	truths.	The	laws	plausibly	have	further	cognitive	functions,	such	as	action-guidance	and	explanation.	But	we	will	focus	on	prediction	because	it	arguably	is	the	function	of	the	laws	that	is	most	central	to	the	practice	of	physics.	So,	CU	says	that	laws	of	nature	help	limited	beings	get	around	in	the	









                                               12	For	chaotic	systems,	however,	small	inaccuracies	in	the	data	do	lead	to	big	inaccuracies	in	the	solutions	even	if	dependence	is	continuous.		
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evolution	of	a	rock,	we	can	typically	treat	the	forces	acting	on	it	from	afar	as	constant	apart	from	small	variations.		We	then	only	need	to	guarantee	that	these	small	variations	in	background	factors	(at	least	in	the	majority	of	cases)	do	not	make	a	difference	to	the	rock’s	macroscopic	behavior.	Fortunately,	this	result	follows	from	features	of	the	dynamical	laws	and	plausible	background	assumptions.	Our	best	candidates	for	the	fundamental	dynamical	laws	are	such	that	for	many	macroscopic	system	the	vast	majority	of	compatible	microstates	are	associated	with	the	same	macroscopic	behavior	(this	feature	is	closely	related	to	the	above	described	error-tolerance).	We	then	only	need	to	assume	that	a	given	macroscopic	system	is	in	such	a	‘typical’	microstate.	This	typicality	then	guarantees	that	small	differences	in	external	forces	are	unlikely	to	make	a	difference	to	its	macroscopic	behavior.	Small	difference	in	outside	forces	only	make	a	difference	to	the	system's	microstate.	But	since	the	vast	majority	of	microstates	compatible	with	a	given	macrostate	are	associated	with	the	same	macroscopic	behavior,	such	forces	do	not	result	in	a	different	macroscopic	behavior	(cf.	Elga	2007:	110).	So	we	can	ignore	any	forces	acting	on	the	rock	from	afar	that	are	so	small	that	they	only	affect	its	exact	microstate,	such	as	air	molecules	bumping	into	it	or	small	local	variations	in	gravitational	forces.		It	is	a	highly	non-trivial	feature	of	our	best	candidates	for	the	fundamental	dynamical	laws	that	the	vast	majority	of	microstates	compatible	with	a	given	macrostate	lead	to	the	same	macroscopic	behavior.	And	it	is	empirically	well-confirmed	that	we	usually	get	the	correct	predictions	about	the	future	behavior	of	systems	by	assuming	that	their	behavior	is	‘typical’.13	These	two	facts	together	allow	us	to	describe	the	behavior	of	systems	in	terms	of	autonomous,	higher-order	dynamics,	as	they	feature,	for	example,	in	thermodynamics.	As	a	consequence,	coarse-grained	information	about	the	rock	plus	the	knowledge	of	a	small	number	of	background	conditions	is	enough	to	predict	its	rough	macroscopic	evolution.	These	features	of	our	actual	best	candidates	for	the	laws	of	nature	then	are	evidence	that	science	aims	for	laws	that	are	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us.		







                                               14	What	if	there	are	alien	scientists	who,	like	Gods	or	Laplacean	demons,	can	know	the	world’s	state	with	complete	precision	and	have	no	limitations	in	their	processing	power?	We	contend	that	these	agents,	if	they	have	a	concept	of	a	law	of	nature	at	all,	would	have	a	different	concept	from	ours	such	that	our	laws	would	not	be	of	particular	interest	to	them.	
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make-up	as	cognizers	do	this	work	dispenses	with	this	machinery	and	has	the	additional	benefit	of	making	immediately	clear	why	we	care	about	the	distinction	between	laws	and	non-laws.15	In	light	of	these	three	points,	the	anthropocentricity	arising	from	making	best	systems	best	for	us	is	not	objectionable.		The	second	worry	is	that	CU	may	be	at	odds	with	certain	prime	candidates	for	fundamental	physical	laws.	In	particular,	you	may	think	that	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics	do	not	seem	geared	toward	being	cognitively	useful	for	creatures	like	us.	After	all,	the	interpretation	of	these	laws	is	notoriously	tricky	and	we	can	at	best	derive	probabilistic	predictions	from	them.	So,	you	may	worry	that	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics	would,	according	to	CU,	not	be	good	candidates	for	fundamental	physical	laws.		 In	reply,	we	argue	that	science’s	preference	for	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics	is	fully	in	accordance	with	CU.	First,	quantum	mechanics’	core	formalism,	consisting	of	the	quantum	state,	the	Schrödinger	equation	and	the	Born	rule,	allows	us	to	derive	a	large	number	of	predictions	from	incomplete	information.	Quantum	mechanics	is	our	empirically	best	confirmed	theory	in	the	history	of	science.	So,	actual	limited	scientists	have	derived	more	accurate	predictions	from	it	than	from	any	other	theory.	Indeed,	quantum	mechanics	has	features	similar	to	the	features	that	make	classical	mechanics	useful	for	limited	beings.	Macroscopic	systems	can	often	be	treated	as	relatively	isolated	from	their	surroundings	even	in	cases	where	locality	is	violated	due	to	quantum	entanglement	(see	Elga	2007:	109,	fn.	7).	And,	moreover,	quantum	mechanics	allows	us	to	make	predictions	even	when	we	are	ignorant	of	the	exact	microstate	of	the	relevant	system.	We	can	often,	at	least	in	practice,	derive	the	approximately	correct	predictions	about	macroscopic	systems	in	terms	of	higher-level	dynamics	that	allows	us	to	ignore	various	aspects	of	the	relevant	systems	(see	Wallace	forthcoming:	§10).16	Second,	that	science	aims	for	laws	that	are	cognitively	useful	does	not	mean	that	the	resulting	laws	will	be	perfectly	tailored	to	our	cognitive	needs.	Nature,	after	all,	needs	to	cooperate	too.	We	can	imagine	candidates	for	the	fundamental	physical	laws	that	would	be	more	useful	for	limited	creatures	than	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics.	














                                               18	CU	also	solves	a	famous	problem	for	Lewis’s	version	of	the	BSA.	Take	a	maximally	strong	system	S	and	“[l]et	F	be	a	predicate	that	applies	to	all	and	only	things	at	worlds	where	S	holds.	Take	F	as	primitive,	and	axiomatize	S	(or	an	equivalent	thereof)	by	the	single	axiom	∀x	Fx”	(Lewis	1983:	367).	Since	∀x	Fx	is	maximally	informative	and	simple,	Lewis’s	BSA	has	the	absurd	consequence	that	all	regularities	whatsoever	come	out	as	laws.	Lewis	evades	this	problem	by	restricting	predicates	to	ones	referring	to	perfectly	natural	properties.	Our	account	requires	no	such	objective	joints,	since	∀x	Fx	does	not	provide	information	that	is	storable	or	computable	by	resource-bounded	creatures	and	so	is	cognitively	useless.	Our	account,	thus,	incorporates	the	central	insight	of	the	so-called	‘Better	Best	System	Account’,	viz.,	that	Humeans	need	not	(and	should	not)	posit	a	naturalness	constraint	on	the	language	the	best	system	is	couched	in	(see	Cohen	and	Callender	2009).	
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	 In	reply,	we	argue	that	including	the	mass	of	the	universe	in	a	best	system	would	decrease	its	cognitive	usefulness.	As	Hall	points	out,	knowing	the	mass	of	the	universe	is	very	valuable	for	certain	predictions.	For	example,	it	might	be	useful	for	deriving	whether	the	universe	will	expand	forever	or	end	up	in	a	big	crunch.	However,	suppose	you	want	to	know	how	a	rock	on	your	desk	evolves	over	the	next	two	minutes;	whether	a	certain	bridge	will	survive	an	upcoming	storm;	or	what	happens	when	two	proton	beams	meet	in	the	Large	Hadron	Collider.	To	solve	these	and	similar	problems,	it	is	not	necessary	to	know	even	the	approximate	mass	of	the	universe.	Consequently,	the	mass	of	the	universe	would	add	information	to	the	laws	that	is	completely	irrelevant	for	most	(approximate)	truths	we	derive	from	the	laws.	Thus,	the	rather	minimal	increase	of	predictions	that	adding	the	mass	of	the	universe	adds	to	the	laws	provides	comes	at	the	price	of	decreasing	their	efficiency	significantly.	So,	it	is	more	useful	to	treat	the	mass	of	the	universe	as	an	auxiliary	hypothesis	that	is	called	on	when	needed	rather	than	to	add	it	to	your	laws.19	(Notice	that	a	system	that	balances	strength	and	simplicity	as	Lewis	understands	them	may	rule	out	the	phony	constant	for	similar	reasons.)		 A	similar	worry	about	our	account	concerns	why	our	best	candidates	for	laws	of	nature	allow	possible	initial	conditions	where	creatures	like	us	do	not	exist,	for	example	where	there	is	no	life	in	the	universe.	If	the	laws	are	tailored	toward	helping	creature	like	us	navigate	the	world,	why	should	they	be	applicable	to	situations	that	exclude	the	existence	of	such	creatures?	We	reply	that	adding	conditions	that	ensure	the	existence	of	creatures	like	us	to	the	laws	would	add	extra	information	to	the	laws	that	are	irrelevant	for	most	predictions.	For	example,	when	we	want	to	predict	the	evolution	of	a	rock,	it	is	irrelevant	whether	the	universe	contains	life	or	not.	Moreover,	if	we	want	to	use	the	laws	to	make	predictions	from	the	kind	of	evidence	creatures	like	us	have,	then	it	would	be	redundant	to	build	into	the	laws	that	creatures	like	us	exist.	Our	having	of	the	evidence	already	entails	that	there	is	life	in	the	universe.	
                                               19	You	may	worry	that	the	above	considerations	also	rule	out	certain	bona	fide	laws.	Suppose	(as	may	well	be	the	case)	that	weak	nuclear	force	is	completely	irrelevant	to	most	of	the	approximate	truths	that	we	derive	from	the	laws.	Why	then	should	there	be	a	force	law	for	that	force?	What	is	the	difference	between	that	force	law	and	a	fact	about	the	approximate	mass	of	the	universe?	In	reply,	we	argue	that	we	still	would	need	a	force	law	to	tell	us	that	weak	nuclear	force	can	be	ignored	in	almost	all	situations.	With	regard	to	the	approximate	mass	of	the	universe,	the	gravitational	laws	tell	us	that	we	can	ignore	it	in	most	cases.	But	without	a	law	for	weak	nuclear	force,	we	would	have	no	idea	whether	in	any	given	situation,	we	could	ignore	weak	nuclear	force	or	have	to	take	it	into	account	after	all.		
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CU	also	explains	why	facts	that	decrease	the	modal	latitude	of	the	laws	(by	making	them	apply	to	fewer	non-actual	circumstances)	sometimes	can	be	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.	For	example,	Albert	(2015)	proposes	adding	two	additional	fundamental	laws	to	our	best	physical	theories:	the	“past	hypothesis,”	which	says	that	“the	universe	had	some	particular,	simple,	compact,	symmetric,	cosmologically	sensible,	very	low-entropy	initial	macrocondition”	(Albert	2015:	5).	And	the	“statistical	postulate,”	which	specifies	a	uniform	probability	distribution	over	the	microstates	compatible	with	the	past	hypothesis	(Albert	2015:	5).	Regarding	the	past	hypothesis	as	a	fundamental	physical	law	reduces	the	modal	latitude	of	the	laws	because	it	rules	out	possible	initial	conditions	where	the	universe	started	in	a	different	macrocondition	than	its	actual,	low-entropy	one.	 	CU	explains	why	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	may	be	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.20	According	to	our	account,	science	aims	for	modal	latitude	only	to	the	extent	that	doing	so	facilitates	inferring	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	or	inaccurate	information	about	systems.	If	applying	the	laws	to	non-actual	circumstances	is	not	useful	for	this	purpose,	it	is	no	longer	a	virtue	for	the	laws	to	cover	these	circumstances.	Now,	adding	the	past	hypothesis	to	the	laws	rules	out	initial	conditions	where,	for	example,	the	universe	started	in	a	high-entropy	macrostate.	Covering	these	possible	initial	conditions,	however,	is	not	required	to	make	the	laws	applicable	to	the	incomplete	or	slightly	inaccurate	models	that	we	typically	use	for	predictions.	These	models	are	plausibly	still	compatible	with	the	initial	macrocondition	of	the	actual	universe,	and	so	the	past	hypothesis	does	not	get	in	the	way	of	allowing	us	to	derive	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	or	inaccurate	information.		 If	Albert	is	right,	then	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	are	in	fact	required	to	derive	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	information.	Dynamical	laws	alone,	even	deterministic	ones,	are	not	enough	if	you	do	not	know	a	system’s	state	with	complete	precision.	All	plausible	candidates	for	the	dynamical	laws	allow,	given	only	a	macroscopic	description	of	a	system,	multiple	different	behaviors,	many	of	which	would	strike	us	as	bizarre.	For	example,	if	you	consider	a	rock	governed	by	the	Newtonian	laws	of	motion,	then	nothing	“is	going	to	stand	in	the	way	of	that	rock’s	suddenly	ejecting	one	of	its	trillions	of	elementary	particulate	constituents	at	enormous	speed	
                                               20	We	suspect	that	something	similar	applies	to	other	candidates	for	fundamental	physical	laws	that	decrease	modal	latitude,	such	as	force	laws	and	other	laws	of	coexistence.	
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and	careening	off	in	an	altogether	different	direction,	or	(for	that	matter)	spontaneously	disassembling	itself	into	statuettes	of	the	British	royal	family,	or	(come	to	think	of	it)	reciting	the	Gettysburg	Address”	(Albert	2015:	1).	So,	deriving	any	approximately	true	predictions	from	incomplete	information	requires	a	probability	distribution	over	microstates	that	makes	sure	that	such	bizarre	behaviors	have	negligibly	small	probabilities	(cf.	Ismael	2009:	91–92).	(Note	that	such	a	probability	distribution	is	also	relevant	for	why	we	can	largely	ignore	distant	influences	when	making	predictions	about	the	macroscopic	behavior	of	systems.	See	our	discussion	of	Elga	in	§3).		Albert	argues	that	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	specify	the	needed	probability	distribution	in	a	very	simple	way.	If	Albert	is	right	about	this	role,	then	adding	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	to	our	laws	dramatically	increases	the	laws’	cognitive	usefulness	because	it	is	necessary	for	efficiently	deriving	(approximate)	truths	from	incomplete	information.21	This	radical	increase	in	the	number	of	predictions	one	can	make	from	incomplete	information	would	then	plausibly	outweigh	the	added	complexity.	This	role	distinguishes	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	from,	e.g.,	the	mass	of	the	universe.	While	knowing	the	mass	of	the	universe	is	occasionally	required	for	deriving	certain	(approximate)	truths,	the	former	facts,	if	Albert	is	right,	are	relevant	whenever	we	derive	any	(approximate)	truths	from	mere	macroscopic	information	about	a	system.		That	facts	like	the	past	hypothesis	are	candidates	for	laws	of	nature	is	evidence	that	science	does	not	aim	unconditionally	at	a	strong	DH	and	a	weak	ICH	in	Hall’s	sense.	Recall	that	the	ICH	measures	how	many	possible	initial	conditions	a	set	of	laws	allow	and	the	DH	measures	how	many	possible	ways	there	are	for	the	world	to	evolve	given	specified	initial	conditions.	Adding	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	to	deterministic	dynamical	laws	does	not	strengthen	their	DH.	So,	deterministic	laws	already	have	as	strong	a	DH	as	laws	can	possibly	have.		But	adding	the	past	hypothesis	and	the	statistical	postulate	does	strengthen	the	ICH	because	it	rules	out	metaphysically	possible	initial	conditions	that	are	allowed	otherwise.	Focusing	on	cognitive	usefulness	explains	why	we	still	consider	these	facts	as	candidates	for	laws	of	nature.	Allowing	a	certain	range	of	possible	initial	conditions	is	
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